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9.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter considers a few simple scenarios that introduce some potential scale 
to the input-output multiplier model analyses in Chapters 3, 4 and 6 in considering 
the potential wider economic impacts of a projected shift to a hydrogen economy. 
Again, focus is mainly on the case of private transportation and the shift from petrol/
diesel (reined fossil fuels) to hydrogen, with the supply chain of the latter proxied by 
those of the existing UK gas and/or electricity supply sectors. The key characteristic 
of these proxies is the markedly stronger up-stream supply chain linkages within the 
UK economy as compared to the more import-intensive reined fuel supply industry. 
A central conclusion of the modelling work in this paper is that if a future hydrogen 
sector shares this characteristic, net positive impacts on the UK economy as whole are 
likely when/if private transportation transitions to the use of hydrogen as a fuel source. 
In this context, the simulations in this chapter focus on the extent to which spending 
on hydrogen fuel in private transportation may be able to ‘absorb’ GDP and employ-
ment losses resulting from reduced demand for petrol/diesel. These are variables that 
may be of particular political and policy concern in any development of the energy 
system. Impacts are considered over several longer timeframes up to 2050. 
The irst step taken is to introduce forecasted scenarios across different discreet time 
periods for reduced demand and use of petrol and diesel as reined fossil fuels for 
use in private vehicles. This is translated to the projected reduction in UK household 
expenditure required to conduct a simulation using the input-output model. The 
results are then taken as a base against which to scale and compare potential uptake 
of hydrogen fuels (based on the gas and electricity proxies introduced in Chapter 3). 
In setting up the scenario regarding reduced demand for UK reined fuels sector (which 
supplies petrol and diesel), this chapter draws loosely on scenario analyses conducted for 
the White Paper 3. However, the core of the analysis is applying multiplier tools used in 
Chapters 4 and 6 to consider the sectoral breakdown of the reined fuel and gas/electricity 
hydrogen proxy sector. That is, the current chapter introduces some potential scale to the 
marginal potential impacts considered in Chapters 4 and 6. Two scenarios are analysed:
Scenario 1: What are the economy-wide impacts of a change in UK household 
demand for reined fuel products (petrol and diesel) if demand/expenditure falls as 
a result of a transition to lower carbon fuel sources. This scenario is considered for 
various time frames between 2015 and 2050. 
Scenario 2: What are the potential economy wide implications if reduced UK house-
hold expenditure on reined fuels is reallocated, to some degree, to spending on 
hydrogen, where the supply chain for the latter is given by one of the two proxies 
identiied in Chapter 3 (and applied in Chapters 4 and 6). Speciically, how much 
spending on hydrogen may be required to prevent a net contraction in GDP and/or 
employment (as key macroeconomic variables) as a result of the fuel spending shift? 
The approach is also motivated by the fact that appropriate information (i.e. in format 
required to inform the economic input-output model) is not available on the level 
and particularly the likely price of spending required to hydrogen vehicles. 
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At this stage it is important to relect on a couple of issues that are relevant in consid-
ering the transition to a hydrogen economy. First, while ideas around targets for sup-
porting the transition to a hydrogen economy/low carbon economy are beginning to 
emerge, it is valid to question whether the UK is at the stage of setting a strategic plan; 
that is, whether goals in this respect are actually executable and achievable. Secondly, 
but linked to the latter point, it is not yet clear who would be responsible for making 
the transition to use of hydrogen fuel happen. While there is a clear role for Government 
in supporting such a shift, and this may be motivated by the type of potential for wider 
economic expansion considered here, the motivation for private irms to play a role in 
the hydrogen supply chain is less obvious. Similarly, the motivation and incentives for 
households to assume responsibility for the private investment spending (on vehicles) 
required for them actually use hydrogen technology and fuels is not established or 
straightforward. Therefore, the scenarios and potential economy-wide impacts identi-
ied here must be viewed with caution, assuming as they do that the shift takes place. 
In this context, one of the overarching objectives of the economy-wide analysis in this 
paper is to begin to consider what may possibly happen if all actors can be persuaded 
to participate in the transition to hydrogen economy. In order to do so, this chapter 
focuses on demonstrating how the input-output multipliers identiied in Chapters 3, 
4 and 6 may be used to consider scaled scenarios to inform an evidence-base on the 
wider potential societal beneits of the transition to a hydrogen economy. 
However, there is need for caution in that the scenarios considered in this chapter 
involve a marked change in the scale of activity in different sectors so that the restric-
tive assumptions (discussed in Section 3.4, chapter 3) become particularly relevant.
9.2 APPLYING MULTIPLIER ANALYSIS FOR SCENARIO ANALYSIS 
IN POTENTIAL DEPLOYMENT OF HYDROGEN IN THE UK
The underpinning argument of the modelling work in this White Paper is that the 
UK ‘Reined Fuels’ sector (sector details in Table 9.3 below), which supplies the 
petrol and diesel currently used to run most private cars, is import-intensive and has 
relatively weak upstream linkages within the UK economy. Speciically, its headline 
multipliers – for GDP, output, employment and wage income – are the lowest of all 
103 industries identiied in the UK input-output framework. The implication is that 
any reallocation of spending away from reined fuels towards any other UK industry 
is likely to result in a net positive impact on the production of goods and services 
and associated creation of value-added and jobs within the UK economy.
Under Scenario 2 below, the impacts of a potential contraction in the UK economy 
will be examined in context of the scaled reallocation of household spending towards 
hydrogen that would be required to deliver zero net impact on GDP, and no job losses 
across the economy as a while, from switching fuel sources. Before that, this section 
irst considers the gross impacts of a reduction in total inal household demand for 
the output of the UK Reined Fuel sector.
This chapter examines the potential of a near term to long term role of hydrogen 
in the UK Transport sector, at discreet points between 2015 and 2050. For modelling 
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purposes, the input-output base year of 2010 is considered as a period where no 
hydrogen supply is present. Thus, the post 2010 period, speciically from 2015–2020, 
may be considered as a critical path in the transition to a hydrogen economy. At this 
stage it expected that investment hydrogen-enabling infrastructure is on-going and the 
UK is getting ‘hydrogen ready’ to facilitate long term use of hydrogen throughout the 
economy (the third scenario below focuses on the potential impacts of R&D investment 
at this stage). However, there is no deployment of hydrogen in transport sector over 
this period. This would be consistent with an assumption of non-uniform deployment 
of hydrogen across the economy (i.e. hydrogen supply for non-transport purposes may 
come into effect). Moreover, investment in hydrogen technologies and infrastructure 
would take time to be realised, which will involve factoring in consumer acceptance.
Figure 9.1 provides an illustration of the projected contraction in demand for reined 
fossil fuels (petrol and diesel) relative to the estimated demand and contribution of 
hydrogen in the UK transport sector. Speciically, it illustrates the potential expenditure 
(in billions of UK pounds) on reined fossils fuels in comparison to expected spend on 
hydrogen for all (not just private/household) car transport from 2015–2050. The blue 
shaded area captures what may be a ‘critical path’ through the 2015 to 2025 period where 
the UK economy is developing and implementing all necessary technologies, investment 
and innovation to support a transition to a hydrogen economy. Hence, expenditure and 
demand for traditional reined fossil fuels in transport remain dominant from 2015–2025. 
On the other hand, the green-shaded area represents what may be regarded as a ‘full 
contribution’ path, where it is expected the fuel used in cars is fully diversiied with 
low carbon energy sources and hydrogen is the dominant fuel choice in UK car transport. 
Figure 9.1 Expenditure on fuel/energy on all (not just household/domestic) 
car travel in the UK.
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Source: The projected expenditure on fuel/energy for car travel in Figure 9.1 are the authors’ 
calculations using UK Department for Transport Statistics (2015) average new car fuel consumption: 
Great Britain, 1997–2014 igures86 and Mckinsey Company (2010) A portfolio of power-trains for 
Europe: A fact-based analysis: The role of battery electric vehicles, plug-in hybrids and fuel cell electric 
vehicle report.87 
86  www.gov.uk/government/collections/transport-statistics-great-britain.
87  https://europeanclimate.org/documents/Power_trains_for_Europe.pdf.
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For instance, if we read down the third numerical in Table 9.1, it is estimated that by 
2025 hydrogen begins on a near term small scale in car transport. From this point, a 
gradual diversiication of the fuel mix is projected, with petrol/diesel disappearing by 
2035. The estimated potential direct impact of this is that UK car users will require 
14billion litres of petrol and diesel to travel 259.31 Bvkm. This corresponds to a point 
in Figure 9.1 where there is a total spend of around £7billion. In contrast 1.82 billion 
kg of hydrogen would be potentially required to travel 249.03 Bvkm for hydrogen 
fuelled vehicles with total spend of £9million.
Table 9.1 Fuel consumption for car travel 2015–2050.
Distance travelled 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
Reined fuel  
(Billion vehicle 
kilometres) 
437.46 472.70 259.31 82.48 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Hydrogen  
(Billion vehicle 
kilometres)
0.69 0.24 249.03 436.02 595.16 567.59 497.73 583.16
Units of fuel/energy      
Reined fuel  
(Billion litres)
26.42 27.61 14.61 4.56 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Hydrogen  
(Billion kg)
0.01 0.00 1.82 3.03 4.02 3.72 3.18 3.60
Source: The projected distance travelled by fuel/energy in Table 9.1 are the author’s calculations using 
UK Department for Transport Statistics (2015) average new car fuel consumption: Great Britain, 
1997–2014 igures and Mckinsey & Company (2010) A portfolio of power-trains for Europe: A fact-
based analysis: The role of battery electric vehicles, plug-in hybrids and fuel cell electric vehicle report.
It is important to lag up again that the igures in Table 9.1 are approximations and 
should be treated cautiously. Projections are required because there are obviously no 
observed igures for hydrogen use in the future at the time of this exercise, and no or 
incomplete information is available on actual or relative hydrogen/fossil fuel prices 
and likely quantities involved. Therefore, comparative expenditures for reined fuels 
in conventional cars versus hydrogen use in appropriate new vehicle types may likely 
to be under or over estimated at the current time. However, the projections provide a 
useful basis to approximate the likely relative negative and positive impacts on UK 
GDP and employment through the transition period.
9.2.1 Scenario 1: Change in household demand for UK reined fuel
The previous section gives a forecast of the potential change in fuel use, focussing 
on petrol/diesel as reined fossil fuels in comparison to hydrogen, in different discreet 
time periods. Given that the economic modelling work here has placed emphasis 
on the fact that transition to hydrogen would involve contraction in the UK Reined 
Fuel supply industry, as well as any expansion around new activity involved in 
supply hydrogen, the period of contraction in reined fuel supply (including its 
domestic supply) will ultimately have implications on some UK household incomes 
and expenditure across different goods and services and spend across various uses. 
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In irst scenario the potential impacts of such a contraction over discrete time periods 
is considered. Drawing on results from the projections discussed above, Table 9.2 
provides a breakdown of potential changes is household demand for and expenditure 
on reined fossil fuel products supplied by the UK industry. Note that, in contrast to 
Figure 9.1 and Table 9.1, the information in Table 9.2 focuses on household use of fuel 
in cars only. However, the percentage change in the demand for reined fuels is taken 
to be the same as percentage change in overall car transport activity. This information 
is then applied to the 2010 input-output data on UK household expenditure on the 
domestic ‘Reined Fuels’ supply sector (which includes imported fuels distributed 
in the UK). That is, we assume that the percentage change in demand is the same as 
the percentage change in expenditure on the input-output sector.
Table 9.2 Reduction in UK household demand for reined fuels.
2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2050
% Change demand for 
reined fuels 
-2% 5% -43% -82% -100% -100% -100%
Change in household 
expenditure (£million)
-148 311 -2,821 -5,373 -6,556 -6,556 -6,556
New household expenditure 
(£million)
6,408 6,867 3,734 1,183 0 0 0
The igures in each column Table 9.2 must be taken as independent of one another 
and applying in absolute terms in the year indicated in the column header. They are 
not cumulative. The percentage change in each year is relative to spending in the base 
accounting year of 2010, when the UK input-output data report a total of £6,556million 
(£6.5billion) in household spending on the outputs of the UK Reined Fuels sector.
For example, taking the case of 2025, Table 9.2 reports that UK total household 
demand and expenditure for reined fuel products is projected to decrease by 43% rel-
ative to 2010. The direct impact of this is that household expenditure on reined fuels 
fall by £2821million (43% of the £6,556million base). In order to consider what this 
means for the wider economy, simple multiplier calculations can be conducted using 
the various output multipliers initially reported in Table 3.1 (Chapter 3), and decom-
posed in Chapter 4. In this chapter focus is on overall GDP and employment impacts. 
However, the impacts on supply chain sectors affected may informed by sectoral level 
results reported in, for example, Figure 4.2 (GDP requirements embedded in supply 
chain sectors for Reined Fuels), although it is important to note that this abstracts 
from own-sector employment in Reined Fuels. The focus in this chapter is on aggre-
gate level results, although attention is drawn to key sectoral level impacts. 
Table 9.3 is an abridged version of Table 3.1. It focuses on the value-added, or GDP, 
and employment multipliers for the Reined Fuels sector, the two hydrogen proxies 
and also the R&D sector that are the subject of simulations here. GDP and employment 
are selected as the macroeconomic indicators that are likely be of most interest to 
policy. However, results could be calculated for output and/or wages. 
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Reminding the reader that multipliers are stated in terms of impacts per £1million of 
inal demand expenditure, calculating the high level economy-wide impacts simply 
involves taking the product of the multiplier from Table 9.3 and the change in UK 
household spending on the sector from Table 9.2. For example, the GDP impact of the 
£148million reduction in spending in the 2015 column of Table 9.2 is calculated using 
the 0.33 output-GDP multiplier for Reined Fuels giving the result of a £49million 
contraction in UK GDP (0.33x148). 
Table 9.3 Output multiplier values for selected UK industries.
Multiplier (activity per £1million inal demand)
SIC Sector/industry name Output
(£million)
Value-
added 
(£million)
Employment 
 (FTE jobs)
Wage 
income 
(GDP)
(£million)
19 Reined fuel (Manufacture of coke 
and reined petroleum products)
1.47 0.33 2.93 0.19
35.1 Hydrogen proxy 1 (Electric power 
generation, transmission and 
distribution)
2.56 0.78 8.05 0.32
35.2 Hydrogen proxy 2 (Manufacture of 
gas; distribution of gaseous fuels) 
2.25 0.81 8.04 0.32
Table 9.3 shows the results of conducting this calculation for each of the discreet time 
periods identiied in the projections above. The key results selected are the change in 
total UK employment, and the value (in £million) of the change in UK GDP, both rela-
tive to the 2010 base in each time period simulated. The impact on UK GDP of even a 
100% reduction in UK household demand for the output of the Reined Fuels supply 
sector is relatively small, translating to a 0.17% contraction relative to the 2010 value. 
Please note that there is no attempt to forecast the general growth path of the UK econ-
omy so that the focus of the results is to isolate the impacts of the reduction in spend-
ing relative to what the economy would look like with no other changes in UK real 
GDP. Moreover, note that the input-output model does not consider the implications 
of any reduced government revenues from spending on reined fuels. This would 
require a more sophisticated economy-wide model and analysis.
Table 9.4 Economy-wide impacts of change in demand for reined fuels:  
Effects in different time periods.
Economy-wide impacts of reduction in expenditure for reined fuel 
  2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2050
% Change in 
expenditure
-2% 5% -43% -82% -100% -100% -100%
Employment (FTE) -434 913 -8,274 -15,757 -19,225 -19,225 -19,225
Value added (GDP) 
(£M)
-49 104 -941 -1,793 -2,187 -2,187 -2,187
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However, the impact on employment may cause greater public and policy concern. 
As soon as 2025, 8,274 full-time equivalent (FTE) jobs are lost. The main loser is the 
Reined Fuels sector itself, with 1,157 FTE jobs lost. However, this is only 14% of the 
total job losses throughout the UK economy. Losses are felt in every one of the 103 UK 
input-output industries. The distribution of job losses is given by Figure 6.1, and this 
impact is largely concentrated in the Reined Fuels industry, where the second biggest 
loser is the wholesale/retail distribution sector. By 2035, when household spending 
on the UK Reined Fuels sector disappears all together, total job losses rise to 19,225 
FTE posts, and 3,277 of these are in the reined fuel and distribution sectors. 
This type of result motivates the focus of the second scenario simulated. People will 
still need to buy fuels (Figure 9.1 shows little over all drop in fuel use to run cars), it 
is just the type of fuel that changes. The focus in Scenario 2 is on how much spending 
on hydrogen is required to absorb the key economy-wide losses reported in Figure 9.3.
9.2.2 Scenario 2: (Partial) reallocation of fuel spend to hydrogen (using proxies)
This scenario considers how much of the reduced UK household spending on petrol/
diesel as reined fossil fuels to run cars would have to be reallocated to spending on 
hydrogen in order that there be a zero net impact at the macroeconomic level from 
the transition from one fuel type to another. The selected focus in the results reported 
here is to determine the level of spending reallocation required to deliver a zero net 
impact on GDP. Modelling experiments revealed that GDP losses are more dificult 
to compensate than employment losses. Policy and public communities are likely 
to prefer an outcome where GDP is unchanged but employment rises, rather than 
no net job gains coupled with even a slight GDP loss. 
Table 9.5 shows the results of the simulation where the structure of the current (2010) 
UK electricity supply sector is taken as a proxy for hydrogen supply. That is the 
electricity industry multipliers (Table 9.3 above) are applied to the projected spend-
ing on hydrogen (the actual electricity sector is assumed to exist independently). 
Focus in Table 9.5 is limited to 2025 (where irst hydrogen spending is present), 
2030 (the last time frame before full contraction of reined fuel spending) and 2050. 
The hydrogen spending required to deliver the net zero GDP impact in each case is 
calculated by taking the contraction GDP reported in Table 9.4 (e.g. £941million in 
2025) and dividing by the output-GDP multiplier of the electricity proxy from Table 
9.3 (0.78). The impact on employment associated with spending on hydrogen is are 
calculated simply by the product of the required change in the inal demand proxy 
(£9,729million in 2025) by the electricity proxy output-employment multiplier from 
Table 9.3 (8.05). The net impact of the reallocation of spending (1,455 jobs gained in 
2025) is calculated by adding the latter result (9,729 FTE jobs in 2025) to the gross 
losses from the contraction in reined fuel spending (repeated in Table 9.5 as 8,274 
jobs in 2025). 
The results in Table 9.5 show that net employment gains of up to 3,382 may be 
delivered by 2050 if suficient spending is reallocated from reined fuels to hydro-
gen fuel. Note that the amount of spending required to deliver the zero net impact 
on GDP in any of the time periods is markedly less than the total amount no longer 
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required for spending on petrol/diesel. For example, in 2025, only £1,208millon of 
the £2,821million reduction in reined fuel spending needs to be spent on hydrogen 
(electricity proxy) in order to deliver a zero net impact on GDP (and create 1,455 
FTE jobs). The remaining £1.61million is freed up to spend either on more hydrogen 
(and the projections in Figure 9.1 suggest more spending would be made/required) 
or on other goods and services, or a combination of both. The key point is that there 
will be an additional spending and, as long as this has at least some UK component 
(rather than being entirely imported) there will be further positive impacts on GDP 
and employment.
Table 9.5 Summary of Scenario 2 results – Hydrogen proxy 1 (electricity supply).
Electricity proxy      
Summary of scenario 2 results 2025 2030 2050
% decrease in expenditure on reined fuels -43% -82% -100%
Change in spending on reined fuel (£million) -2,821 -5,373 -6,556
Change in GDP from contraction in reined fuel  
spending (£million)
-941 -1,793 -2,187
Change in employment from contraction in reined fuel 
spending (FTE jobs)
-8,274 -15,757 -19,225
Required spending on hydrogen proxy (£million) 1,208 2,301 2,808
Gross impact on employment from spending on hydrogen 
proxy (FTE jobs)
9,729 18,528 22,607
Net impact on GDP from fuel spending reallocation (£million) £0 £0 £0
Net impact on employment from fuel spending reallocation  
(FTE jobs)
1,455 2,772 3,382
Freed up funds for spending on hydrogen or other goods  
and services (£million)
1,613 3,072 3,748
However, an important qualiication regarding the use of the electricity proxy 
(and corresponding gas one below) detailed in Section 4.3 of Chapter 4 must be noted. 
The supply chain jobs (and GDP) in the proxies include jobs in the UK off-shore oil 
and gas extraction sector. If the resource used to produce hydrogen is not one that 
would be extracted by the UK off-shore industry (SIC 6) then the employment and val-
ue-added components of the impacts calculated using either electricity or gas proxies 
will be reduced. For example, in 2050, 199 of the 22,607 gross jobs created by spend-
ing on hydrogen are located in the off-shore oil and gas sector. 
As noted elsewhere employment and money figures make no account of the addi-
tional ‘HFC layer’ directly involved in hydrogen production itself or of its likely 
more distributed nature. Figures given are likely to be significantly underesti-
mated relative to those which might be obtained from a more sophisticated model. 
They do however indicate the direction of travel. 
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Table 9.6 Summary of Scenario 2 results – Hydrogen proxy 2 (gas supply).
Gas proxy      
Summary of scenario 2 results 2025 2030 2050
% decrease in expenditure on reined fuels -43% -82% -100%
Change in spending on reined fuel (£million) -2,821 -5,373 -6,556
Change in GDP from contraction in reined fuel 
spending (£million)
-941 -1,793 -2,187
Change in employment from contraction in reined 
fuel spending (FTE jobs)
-8,274 -15,757 -19,225
Required spending on hydrogen proxy (£million) 1,169 2,226 2,716
Gross impact on employment from spending on 
hydrogen proxy (FTE jobs)
9,395 17,892 21,830
Net impact on GDP from fuel spending  
reallocation (£million)
0 0 0
Net impact on employment from fuel spending 
reallocation (FTE jobs)
1,121 2,135 2,605
Freed up funds for spending on hydrogen or other 
goods and services (£million)
1,652 3,147 3,840
In Table 9.6 a corresponding set of results are shown if the gas proxy is used for 
a potential hydrogen supply sector rather than the electricity one above. The key 
point to note is that the gas proxy has a larger output-GDP multiplier than the 
electricity proxy (0.81 compared to 0.78). This means that a smaller reallocation 
of spending to hydrogen (e.g. £1,169million in 2025) is required to deliver a zero net 
impact on GDP. However, this also means that a smaller net boost to employment 
(1,121 FTE jobs in 2025) is associated with the required reallocation of spending 
(the gas and electricity employment are almost the same at 8.04 and 8.05 respec-
tively). However, this simply means that more funds (£1,652million in 2025) 
are freed up to spend on other things. 
9.3 CONCLUSIONS
In the absence of appropriate information to inform fuller simulation analysis using 
the economic input-output models of changes in projected expenditure on hydro-
gen fuels, this chapter has focussed instead on considering the amount of hydrogen 
spending that would be required to absorb any GDP losses arising from contracted 
household spending on petrol/diesel. The results show that it is likely that only a 
partial reallocation of previous spending on reined fossil fuels would be required 
to compensate GDP losses and deliver an employment boost. This is because of 
the stronger domestic up-stream supply chain linkage associate with a hydrogen 
supply sector that shares characteristics of the current UK gas and electricity 
supply proxies. In short, as long as hydrogen supply is less import-intensive and has 
relatively strong domestic linkages, it is likely that any fuel switch will deliver gains 
at the economy-wide level.
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However, it is important to note that there are likely to be sectoral ‘losers’. In 
Chapter 4, Section 4.4, input-output modelling results suggested that only around 
three or four (out of 103) UK industries would suffer net losses in terms of output, 
GDP (and the same is true of employment). However, this was in terms of considering 
a pound for pound reallocation spending. In this chapter, the key result is that the 
compensating (at economy-wide level) hydrogen spend would be less than one pound 
for every pound lost to reined fuel. Therefore, the number of UK industries losing 
out is likely to be greater. However, the largest overall losses should be expected 
in the Reined Fuels industry itself: again, a key point to note is that the modelling 
results here suggest that the petrol/diesel to hydrogen fuel switch will free up income 
to spend on other things, and these in turn (depending on where money is spent) 
will have positive multiplier effects throughout the UK economy. 
